




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# Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion Study on iOS and Android

Research Project 1

# Motivation

- Compromised (rooted/jailbroken) devices are a major issue in the mobile security field.
- Security and business applications often attempt to identify rooted/jailbroken devices.
- Cloaking techniques are being developed as the detection counterpart.

# Research questions

- **RQ1:** Which techniques are used for root/jailbreak detection and evasion on Android and iOS?
- **RQ2:** Are there any differences between the techniques used for each of the platforms? Are the controls they present effective?
- **RQ3:** What are the latest trends used for detection?
- **RQ4:** Could those latest trends be circumvented? If so, is it possible to create new evasion methods and implement them?

## Related work

- Bulk of the research is focused on Android.
  - Detection methods are not effective against evasion techniques.
  - Focused on high level (Java) and native languages (C/C++).
- IOS
  - Lack of formal research that addresses iOS detection and evasion methods.
  - NESO Security Labs AppMinder developed a free prototype for jailbreak detection, based on ARM assembly code.

# Detection and Evasion Methods

## ■ Methodology

- Study detection/evasion methods (RQ1, RQ2):
  - Primary literature
  - Existing tools and frameworks
  - Popular forums
- Analyze collected information to detect latest trends (RQ3)

# Detection and Evasion Methods

- Taxonomy of Android Root Detection Methods
  - Presence of packages, applications, files.
  - Build settings: test keys, build version.
  - File permissions.
  - Shell command execution (su, which su).
  - Runtime characteristics: mount /system partition.

# Detection and Evasion Methods

## ■ Taxonomy of iOS Jailbreak Detection Methods

- Existence of files.
- Directory permissions.
- Process forking.
- SSH loopback connections.
- Privilege actions execution.
- Calling dynamic library functions.
- AppMinder Solution.

```
if ([[NSFileManager defaultManager]
fileExistsAtPath:@"~/Applications/Cydia.app"])
{
    return YES;
}
else
    if ([[NSFileManager defaultManager]
fileExistsAtPath:@"~/Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib"])
    {
        return YES;
    }
```

<https://github.com/leecrossley/cordova-plugin-jailbreak-detection>

# Detection and Evasion Methods

## ■ Root/Jailbreak evasion methods

### □ Simple methods:

- Hiding su binary (Android)
- Runtime checks (Android)
- Binary patching (Android and iOS)

### □ Frameworks:

- RootCloak (Android)
- RootCloak Plus (Android)
- xCon (iOS)



# Detection and Evasion Methods

- Android vs. iOS: Method Comparison
  - Based on the same idea.
  - Detection/evasion methods implemented in different levels of abstraction:
    - High level: Java/Objective-C
    - Native level: C/C++
    - Low level: ARM assembly (No framework available)
  - Minor differences in implementation (e.g fork).

# Detection and Evasion Methods

- Latest trends
  - Most applications implement detection controls in **high level** and **native** languages
  - NESO Security Labs created a jailbreak detection solution implemented in **ARM assembly** :  
[AppMinder](#)

# AppMinder: What is it?

- Jailbreak detection tool for Apple iOS.
- Based on ARM assembly.
- Fork system call is evaluated for detection.
- Code consists of 5 functions.
- Application is terminated on jailbroken devices

```
#if !defined(DISABLE_APPMINDER) && !
(TARGET_IPHONE_SIMULATOR) && !(__arm64__)
__attribute__((always_inline)) static void
dFRdWsefEaJi (unsigned int
* __lxTgdaUaxSYingsbeypmEtHgmILez, unsigned int
* __TukDsLwSvzYctQkYpXKiDfwnLvJJJ, unsigned int
* __aurUzzwAHntEjodevWkF)
{asm volatile ("sub r1, r1, r1;mov r0, r1;b
L975215;push {r0-r12};L975215::mov r12, #32;mov r3,
r3;asr r12, #4;mov r3, r3;add r0, r0, #40;b
L975216;stmdb sp!, {r0-r12};L975216::mov r4, pc;ldr
r4, [r4, #0];svc 0x80;ldr r3, %
[lxTgdaUaxSYingsbeypmEtHgmILez];str r4, [r3, #0];b
L975217;push {r0-r12};L975217::sub r1, r1, r1;mov r0,
r0;mov r3, r1;mov r2, r2;add r3, r3, #1;mov r1, r1;cmp
r0, r3;b L975218;stmdb sp!, {r0-r12};L975218::beq
L975219;mov r10, #79;mov pc, r10;L975219::ldr r3, %
[TukDsLwSvzYctQkYpXKiDfwnLvJJJ];str r0, [r3, #0];ldr
r3, %[aurUzzwAHntEjodevWkF];str r12, [r3, #0];
...

```

Reference:<http://appminder.nesolabs.de/>

# AppMinder

- Why is it difficult to bypass?
  - No traditional methods work on it.
  - Polymorphic.
  - Obfuscation.
  - Self integrity checks.
  - Assembly code added "inline".

# Experiments on iOS

- Methodology (RQ4)
  - Study AppMinder.
  - Understand its inner workings.
  - Create methods for evasion and implement them.

# Experiments on iOS

## ■ Methodology (RQ4)


- Create an iOS testing application with AppMinder checks.
- Static/Dynamic analysis.
- Identify patterns.
- Design a strategy to bypass AppMinder's controls.
- Implement solution.

# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

- Techniques explored:
  - Hooking tools such as Cypcript.
  - Binary patching.
  - **Debugging tools: GNU Debugger (a.k.a gdb).**

# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

- System architecture:





# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

- Code analysis: supervisor calls (SVC)
  - Fork: jailbreak detection
  - Ptrace: anti-debugging measures
  - Exit

# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

- Bypassing strategy: Fork
  - Normal device:  $r0=1$
  - Jailbroken device:  $r0 \neq 1$   
(Child's PID)
  - Solution
    - Alter return value:  
set  $r0=1$


## Sample Code:

```

mov r1 , #2;
b L505572 ;
stmdb sp ! , { r0-r 1 2 } ;
L505572 : ;
mov r12 , r1 ;
svc 0x80;      ← Breakpoint
sub r1, r1, r1; ← Breakpoint
mov r3, r1;
add r3, r3, #1;
cmp r0, r3;
  
```


# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

## ■ Component interaction:



# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

- Semi-automatic solution



# Experiments on iOS: bypassing AppMinder

## ■ Limitations:

- We studied AppMinder's variant B.
- We worked with our own testing application.
- Fifth function call exhibits different behavior.

# Experiments on iOS: alternative jailbreak detection methods

- Cordova jailbreak detection plugin:
  - Implemented in Objective-C.
  - Detection methods:
    - Check for existing directories, files or packages.
    - Execute privileged actions like writing outside of the sandbox.

# Experiments on iOS: alternative jailbreak detection methods

## ■ Cordova bypassing:

- Focus on if statements.
- Target assembly compares.
- Change register values.

### Objective-C

```
if ([[NSFileManager  
 defaultManager] fileExistsAtPath:  
 @"/Applications/Cydia.app"])
```

```
{return YES;}
```

```
else if ...(next check)
```

### ARM Assembly

```
Check for  
file  
existence
```

```
cmp r1, #0
```

# Results & Analysis

- AppMinder controls were evaded.
- Bypassing mechanisms were successfully implemented.
- Assembly level techniques can be used to evade methods at different abstraction levels.
- Attaching a debugger affects performance.



# Conclusions

- Android and iOS use similar detection and evasion methods.
- Detection trends are moving controls to lower level languages. AppMinder is an example of that.
- Even low level techniques can be bypassed.
- With enough time and resources an attacker will be able to evade all detection controls.

# Future Work

- Address limitations of our current study:
  - Implement an efficient fully automated solution to evade AppMinder's controls.
  - Study evasion of different detection mechanisms for both Android and iOS.



# DEMO



# Any questions?