

Modern age burglary

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Outline

- Introduction
- Research question
- Approach
- Analysis
- Attack vectors
- Impact
- Conclusion

Introduction

- Old setup
 - Alarm systems over PSTN
 - Secure
- New setup
 - Alarm systems over IP
 - Secure?

Research question (1)

- Main question:

“Is it possible to perform a burglary without getting noticed by influencing the communication between the alarm system and the control room?”

Research question (2)


- Sub questions:
 - Which attack vectors that targets communication can be used to bypass the alarm system?
 - What could be the impact if alarm systems over IP-based networks are vulnerable for different attack vectors?
 - Which improvements can be made if alarm systems over IP-based networks are vulnerable for different attack vectors?

Approach

- Traffic capturing part 1
 - Blackbox approach
 - Getting familiarized with the data
 - Recognising information
- Traffic capturing part 2
 - Greybox approach
 - Different events

Network setup

- Hub or bridge



Traffic analysis

- Same packets used every time
 - Registration
 - Activating
 - Deactivating
 - Heartbeat
 - Alarm trigger
- Dedicated ports used for each account
- Each packet is acknowledged

Packet analysis (1)

- Two parts
 - Header
 - Event specific
- Acknowledgement from control room
 - Two versions
 - No repeating pattern

Packet analysis (2)

- Different account code
 - 4 digit number
- Two differences
 - Specific part
 - Header

Packet analysis (3)


- Specific part
 - 4 bytes differ
- Encryption
 - Hex values compared to account code
 - XOR
 - Key = 0xB5
- UDP port number
 - Acknowledgement of registration packet
 - Same encryption as account code

Packet analysis (4)

- Header
 - 2 bytes differ
- Must be account code
- Example encryption
 - Account code: 0011
 - Bytes: 0x00 and 0x11
 - XOR
 - Key = 0x85

Think as a burglar

- Activate alarm on location X, deactivate from location Y.
- Trigger alarms from different accounts.



Attack vectors

- Replay attack
 - Disable / enable alarm
 - Trigger alarm sensors
 - DoS (system and human)
- Brute force attack

Replay attack

- Capturing network traffic
- Working data sets
 - Disabling alarm
 - Triggering sensors

DoS attack

- Overloading control room with fake alarms
 - Impact on availability security guards
- Requirements
 - Data set from a real alarm
 - Port numbers
 - Account code
 - Checksum

Brute force attack

- Control room "cooperates"
 - Static registration port used
- Account code + checksum = brute force
 - Account code: 4 digits(0-9) == 10.000 possibilities
 - Checksum: 1 byte == 256 possibilities
 - Total: $10000 * 256 = 2.560.000$ possibilities
 - Total time needed:
 $(2560000/2)/60/60/24) \approx 15$ days

Impact

- PSTN-2-IP sold by different security company's
 - Therefore PSTN-2-IP is actively used
- Newer systems available:
 - Strong encryption
 - Seperate vpn routers
 - QoS

Improvements

- Rewrite protocol
- Protection against replay attacks
- Improve confidentiality
 - Avoid replay attacks with account information
- Improve integrity
 - Avoid decrypting payload from packets
- Improve availability
 - Avoid DoS possibilities

Conclusions

“Is it possible to perform a burglary without getting noticed by influencing the communication between the alarm system and the control room?”

- Protocol vulnerable for replay attacks
- No advanced crypto is used
- DoS
- A burglar needs technical knowledge and resources.

On a side note

"It takes 1,5 hours before a line failure is detected by the control room"

Questions?

- Report soon available at:

https://www.os3.nl/2009-2010/students/kevin_de_kok/rp1

